Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's "Culture of Martydom"

Many reports in the run-up to the presidential elections stressed that even conservative candidates had presented deliberately moderate, pragmatic programmes. Now it is an ultraconservative that will challenge Rafsanjani in Friday's run-off ballot

Mahmoud Ahmedinejad (photo: AP)
For Europe and probably also for the USA, a President Ahmedinejad would be the worst possible disaster for their Iran policies.

​​In countless weblogs and internet fora, in commentaries and statements from reformist public figures, in the interviews given by politicians and intellectuals to Persian language services of western radio stations, one can observe how Iran is slowly groping its way towards a possible explanation for the election result.

One main reason being given is the apathy of the people, with the official turnout of 62% being called into doubt. Many commentators also complain about the splits in the reformist camp; at the same time as some were calling for a boycott of the polls, two reformist candidates were competing against each other.

The relations with the United States

While the left-wing populist cleric Mehdi Karoubi directed his campaign of simple promises to the poorer members of the population, the former education minister, Mostafa Moin was giving positive signals to women, dissidents and ethnic and religious minorities and seemed to be winning increasing support from the urban middle class. A further division among the reformers was caused by the candidature of the former president Ahmed Hashemi Rafsanjani.

However shifty he might be, Rafsanjani seemed to be the only politician in Iran who had the power to stand up to the leaders of the revolution and to push through an improvement in relations with the United States – at least, that's what many voters thought, especially among the western-oriented business classes and the smart set of northern Teheran.

But none of this explains the success of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Conservatives probably still make up a quarter of the Iranian population – perhaps ten or fifteen million voters. But it's hard to imagine that an ultra-radical like Ahmedinejad could pick up six million of their votes – a result which will see him facing Rafsanjani in the run-off.

Even the traditional and poorer parts of the population, who are the most supportive of the Islamic Republic in its current form, are not inclined to support the Islamist excesses and the international isolation which Ahmedinejad promotes.

Suspicion of electoral fraud

It was left to Mehdi Karoubi, one of the longest serving politicians in the Islamic Republic, to say out loud what increasing numbers of Iranians were thinking: on Saturday night he claimed that the voters had been cheated in a big way. Karoubi held a press conference in which he accused the Council of Guardians, the military and the voluntary militia of the Basijis of manipulating the election in favour of the radical outsider.

Karoubi initially did not give any proof to back up his accusation but merely announced he would be delivering evidence in the form of videos and overheard conversations. But it was clear to everyone in Teheran what Karoubi meant.

Many Iranians had seen with their own eyes how, towards evening, voters were being bussed from one polling station to another, where they went in a group to vote. Karoubi's angry outburst ended in the claim that all the power in Iran lay anyway with one man, no matter who the people voted for. He was clearly pointing to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Of all the candidates, only Ahmedinejad had held up the flag of the revolution and had offered Khamenei unconditional loyalty.

Conservative candidates with pragmatic programmes

The other conservative candidates, as well as Hashemi Rafsanjani, had presented deliberately moderate, pragmatic programmes, which included a continuation of the policies of opening up to the West as well as liberalisation at home. But above all, they were all far too personally ambitious to accept the authority of the Supreme Leader unconditionally.

Only a radical like Ahmedinejad, who believes in the "rule of the scholars" ("welayat e-faqih") as a kind of religious guide to salvation, was able to be content with a role as a president who would be little more than a public relations spokesman in the office of the Supreme Leader. With this he hoped to achieve an end to the domestic power struggles which have characterised the Islamic Republic since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and which are still going on within the conservative power elite.

"The culture of martyrdom"

Ahmedinejad went to the polls with the deliberate slogan of strengthening "the culture of martyrdom." For people like him, the Islamic Republic is not just the result of the revolution of 1979, but also the logical conclusion of the Shiite Muslim history of salvation and suffering.

This interpretation of history is based on the "end-time" philosophy of folk Shiism, which gives an almost Messianic task to those see themselves as standing in the tradition of the fourteen-century-long series of fighters for the faith and martyrs.

For them, in the end, the Islamic Republic is founded on the will of God, and that gives those who run it the ideological and psychological legitimacy to set themselves above the will of the people. In this context, it is understandable that Mostafa Moin, the second defeated reform candidate, did not just repeat the accusation of electoral fraud at his press conference, but also warned of "the danger of Fascism" in Iran.

Uncertain conclusion

Mahmoud Ahmedinejad remains the outsider in the run-off on Friday, but he is not entirely without a chance. Hashemi Rafsanjani has access to huge amounts of financial and propaganda support and can, even more than before, emphasise his role as a worldly pragmatist as a contrast to his radical opponent. But at the same time, he is highly disliked by parts of the population, both among opponents and supporters of the regime.

Ahmedinejad, on the other hand, will have no difficulty in mobilising his supporters. For Europe and probably also for the USA, a President Ahmedinejad would be the worst possible disaster for their Iran policies.

For months, the Europeans have scarcely left any doubt that their talks with Iran have been aimed solely at getting a solution to the nuclear issue. Of all the candidates, Hashemi Rafsanjani seemed the most likely to be able to give the West the security guarantees it was looking for. In that case, the Islamic Republic would have been rewarded with extensive economic and political backing. The issue of democracy or support for the reform movement – which consists of more than just President Khatami and now stretches far into the secular camp – have played scarcely any role in the thinking of the Europeans.

The Americans too had signalled that they were moving towards the European Union line and would be likely to find that they can do business with a victorious Rafsanjani. The West's hope that it would be able to come to an agreement with the regime in Teheran would be shattered if Ahmedinejad were to win. But the hope of democracy could – paradoxically – gain a new lease of life.

An end to apathy?

In the recent past, the reformers have no longer been able to convince the people to commit themselves to political change. In spite of all their dissatisfaction, most Iranians had found their place within the status quo, which was indeed becoming more liberal than it had been before Khatami came to power. A President Rafsanjani would scarcely be likely to close off the many new niches for private self-expression which have developed.

He's not interested in ideology; he's interested in power. But if a regime led by Ahmedinejad should try to reverse the social freedoms which have been gained in the last few years, the people are likely to be shaken out of their apathy.

The danger of a violent power struggle could by no means be excluded, and then the West would have to decide on which side it stood. And perhaps it would see that security and stability cannot be reached in the Middle East without democratisation.

Navid Kermani

© Qantara.de 2005

The German-Iranian writer and orientalist Navid Kermani lives in Cologne, Germany. His latest publication is a book of stories "Thou shalt" (Ammann-Verlag Publishers).

This article was previously published in the Swiss daily NZZ.

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